Introduction
Much of the existing theoretical work on auctions concentrates on the allocation of a single good 1 . However, in actual auctions, several heterogeneous goods are often allocated sequentially. If there is no link among the goods then one may be able to apply the single-good analysis repeatedly. However, such a link may arise if budget constraints limit a bidder's ability to bid for later goods when earlier prices deplete limited resources. Individual bidders whose valuations derive from consumption (rather than resale) may clearly be budget-constrained. But the relevance of budget constraints extends well beyond this case. There is a theoretical literature that argues generally that the existence of agency problems implies that firms are effectively budget constrained in their investment decisions
There is also an empirical literature that supports this idea 3 . Thus, theoretical and empirical foundations support the existence of budget constraints. In the context of auctions, for example, even firms that are buying to re-sell may effectively be budget-constrained if the cost of borrowing increases with the amount borrowed 4 (as it is standard to assume in the finance literature) or if capital market imperfections result in budgets for projects being determined on a yearly basis, so that the firms allocate only a fixed amount of capital 5 for the completion of a project. Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1987) shows that budget constraints effectively arise if a bidder is the agent of a principal. When investments are relatively large then capital market imperfections can mitigate the ability of even a large firm to borrow funding. The historic auction of radio spectrum by the FCC in the USA is a good example of an auction in which the investments are relatively large. Cramton (1994) finds it realistic to assume that all firms in PCS (personal communicating services) auctions face budget constraints 6 . As he explains, bidders must raise funds before the auction starts when they do not know exactly how much they will need. Given that i  n  t  s  f  a  c  e  d  b  y  fi  r  m  s  m  a  k  i  n  g  l  a  r  g  e  i  n  v  e  s  t  m  e  n  t  s  i  n  t  h  e  n  a  t  i  o  n  w  i  d  e  n  a  r  r  o  w  b  a  n  d  P  C  S  a  u  c  t  i  o  n  h  e  l  d  i  n  t  h  e  U  n  i  t  e  d  S  t  a  t  e  s  i  n  J  u  l  y  1  9  9  4  .   5   S  e  e  H  e  n  d  r  i  c  k  s  a  n  d  P  o  r  t  e  r  (  1  9  9  2  )  f  o  r  e  m  p  i  r  i  c  a  l  e  v  i  d  e  n  c  e  o  f  c  a  p  i  t  a  l  c  o  n  s  t  r  a  i  n  t  s  i  n  l  a  n  d  l  e  a  s  e  a  u  c  t  i  o  n  s  .   6   A  s  d  o  B  u  r  g  u  e  t  a  n  d  M  c  A  f  e  e  2  0  0  5  . B  u  d  g  e  t  -C  o  n  s  t  r  a  i  n  e  d  S  eu  e  n  t  i  a  l  A  u  c  t  i  o  n  s  w  i  t  h  I  n  c  o  m  p  l  e  t  e  I  n  f  o  r  m  a  t  i  o  n fund-raising is time-consuming and costly, he states that it is reasonable to assume that firms that come to such auctions are budget-constrained. In addition, only forty per cent of narrow band PCS spectrum was for sale in the first spectrum auction held by the FCC; so that, though each spectrum auction was simultaneous, goods were allocated sequentially across auctions as well as simultaneously within an auction. The paper analyzes a private value sequential auction with imperfect information in which bids are continuous. However, that the order of sale affects prices and revenues can be illustrated in a common value auction with complete information and discrete bids. Consider an auction in which two bidders compete (under 2 n d price sealed bid rules for which the bids are in multiples of 1's) for two goods whose values are 200 and 60 respectively. Suppose that the income of one bidder is 130 and that of the other is 60. Note that once good 1 is sold, the income of the winner of good 1 is reduced by the price of good 1. Bidder i's equilibrium bid 7 for good 2 is the minimum of i's valuation for good 2 and i's depleted income. The price of either good can be at most 60 since 60 is the income of one of the bidders. Let bidders and goods be denoted by their initial incomes and values. Bidder 130 has more than enough income to pay 60 for each good. This implies that bidder 60 is willing to pay 60 for whatever good is brought up for sale first since the value of each good is at least 60 and bidder 60 has no option to win good 2 since bidder 130 has at least 70 to bid on good 2 no matter who is allocated good 1 in equilibrium. The maximum that bidder 130 is willing to pay for good 1 depends on the order of sale.
Consider the order of sale equal to 200, 60. Bidder 130 faces a price of 60 on good 60 if bidder 60 loses good 200. Thus, if bidder 130 pays a price of p for good 200 then bidder 130's payoff is 200 − p. If instead, bidder 130 allows bidder 60 to obtain good 200 for a price of p ≤ 60 then bidder 60 has 60 − p to bid on good 60. In this case bidder 130 receives a payoff of p. Since 200 − p > p when p ≤ 60, bidder 130 is willing to pay more than 60 for good 200 when it is brought up for sale first. So, when the order is 200, 60, each good is allocated to bidder 130 at a price of 60 and revenue equals 120. Now consider the order of sale 60, 200. Bidder 130 is no longer willing to obtain good 60 at any price less than or equal to 60. If bidder 130 obtains good 60 at a price of p ≤ 60, then bidder 130 also obtains good 200 at a price of 60 so that bidder 130's payoff is 200 − p. However, if bidder 130 lets bidder 60 obtain good 60 at a price of p ≤ 60 then bidder 130 obtains good 200 at a price of 60 − p so that bidder 130's payoff is 140 + p. Since   7   F  o  r  t  h  e  d  e  t  a  i  l  s  o  f  s  o  l  u  t  i  o  n  s  t  o  a  u  c  t  i  o  n  s  o  f  c  o  m  p  l  e  t  e  i  n  f  o  r  m  a  t  i  o  n  w  i  t  h  t  w  o  b  u  d  g  e  t  -c  o  n  s  t  r  a  i  n  e  d  b  i  d  d  e  r  s  a  n  d  t  w  o  g  o  o  d  s  s  e  e  B  e  n  o  i  t  a  n  d  K  r  i  s  h  n  a  2  0  0  0  ,  P  i  t  c  h  i  k  a  n  d  S  c  h  o  t  t  e  r  1  9  8  8  ,  a  n  d  P  i  t  c  h  i  k  a  n  d  S  c  h  o  t  t  e  r  1  9  8  6  . B  u  d  g  e  t  -C  o  n  s  t  r  a  i  n  e  d  S  eu  e  n  t  i  a  l  A  u  c  t  i  o  n  s  w  i  t  h  I  n  c  o  m  p  l  e  t  e  I  n  f  o  r  m  a  t  i obtain both goods at relatively high prices under the order 200, 60. The prices and revenue generated by the order 200, 60 are higher than that generated by the order 60, 200.
The order of sale affects revenue and prices whether information is perfect and bids are discrete or whether information is imperfect and bids are continuous. The intuition derives from the fact that once good 1 is sold, there is an option to win good 2. The value of the option depends on the depleted income of all bidders and on the value of the good 2. The depleted income depends on the order of sale. The above example might lead one to believe that selling the more highly valued good first always generates the highest revenue. In fact, Benoit and Krishna (1998) show that in a complete information common value auction of two goods and three budget-constrained bidders, this is always the case. Their result extends to two goods and n budget-constrained bidders since it is only the top three incomes that are relevant when analyzing the equilibria of a budget-constrained auction of two goods in a complete information common value auction with two or more bidders. However, it is easy to generate budget-constrained sequential common value auctions in which selling the most highly valued of 3 goods does not generate the highest revenue A more plausible proscription for revenue maximization might exist if a good is highlyvalued enough and incomes are low enough. In this case, selling the highly valued good first maximizes revenue 9 . (Thus, you might want to sell a Rembrandt before selling a ten year old Honda Accord if you are selling both in a sequential auction.) What is not clear is whether there are any systematic rules that govern the relationship among the prices of a good, the revenue, and the order of sale when the valuations are similar and when the income covers the valuation of each good. If Toyota Camrys are sold in an auction that also sells Honda Accords, then does the order of sale still affect prices and revenue?
I study a budget-constrained version of the benchmark model of a private-valuation sealed-bid sequential auction of two goods in which two risk-neutral bidders are drawn from 8   O  n  e  c  o  m  p  l  e  t  e  i  n  f  o  r  m  a  t  i  o  n  e  x  a  m  p  l  e  i  s  t  h  a  t  i  n  w  h  i  c  h  3  b  i  d  d  e  r  s  (  w  i  t  h  i  n  c  o  m  e  s  o  f  6  0  ,  8  0  a  n  d  8  0  )  c  o  m  p  e  t  e  f  o  r  3  g  o  o  d  s  (  w  i  t  h  c  o  m  m  o  n  v  a  l  u  e  s  o  f  8  0  ,  6  0  a  n  d  1  0  0  )  u  s  i  n  g  s  e  c  o  n  d  p  r  i  c  e  r  u  l  e  s  i  n  w  h  i  c  h  b  i  d  s  a  r  e  m  u  l  t  i  p  l  e  s  o  f  o  n  e  .  T  h  e  o  r  d  e  r  o  f  s  a  l  e  8  0  ,  6  0  ,  1  0  0  g  e  n  e  r  a  t  e  s  a  r  e  v  e  n  u  e  o  f   1  3  0   w  h  i  l  e  e  a  c  h  o  f  t  h  e  o  t  h  e  r  o  r  d  e  r  s  g  e  n  e  r  a . When information is complete, revenue is affected, in a systematic way 1 1 , by the price formation rule (i.e. the rule that specifies the price as a function of the bids). Essentially, budget constraints impose an odd sort of risk aversion and risk aversion causes revenue to depend on the price formation rule.
Assuming information is incomplete does not change this. In order to isolate the pure effect of the budget-constraints on the prices of goods relative to their order of sale and the price formation rule, I restrict to a world in which the expected revenue is invariant with respect to a class of price formation rules that includes 1 s t and 2 n d price rules. In this world, I find that the auction revenue depends on the sequence of sale and that the price of a good depends on its position in the sequence of sale in an intuitive way.
In the literature on auctions for one good, authors restrict the search for an equilibrium among symmetric bidding functions that increase in a bidder's type. In a budget-constrained sequential auction of two goods, I restrict attention to symmetric bidding functions but do not assume monotonicity. I find that it is possible for there to exist two symmetric equilibrium bidding functions that differ with respect to efficiency, revenue and allocation. Whether revenue is maximized or the allocation is efficient depends on the relationship between the bidding function and the valuation and income functions and not on the price rules. Theorem 2 and its Corollary 3 can be used to compare the expected revenue and efficiency when heterogenous goods α and β say, are sold in the order α, β to that when they are sold in the order β, α. Revenue is maximized when the bidding function is ordinally equivalent to the income function. The allocation is efficient when the bidding function is ordinally equivalent to the difference in valuation functions. In particular, if the valuation and income functions are increasing then revenue is maximized and the allocation is efficient when the good whose valuation increases more rapidly in a bidder's type is sold first. Thus, even when there are only two goods, selling the highest valued good first need not generate the highest revenue. In particular, if one is auctioning the contents of a household, then selling a wall painting by an unknown artist (whose value may be highly variable) before the used ride-on lawn mower (whose value may be high but publicly known) maximizes revenue. price rules the price of a good is higher when it is sold first rather than second. The bidder who loses good 1 may bid up its price in order to obtain good 2 for a lower price. Under 1 s t price rules, the price of a good is higher when it is sold second. The bidder who loses good 1 fears bidding up the price due to the possibility of obtaining the good at too high a price.
The fact that the sequence of sale affects both the prices and revenue means that the interests of a seller who may wish to maximize the price of a good may conflict with those of an auctioneer who may wish to maximize long run auction revenue. A change in the form of the auction may change the number of bidders who are attracted by the mechanism, a consideration that does not enter my model Theorems 4, 11, and 12 imply that the law of one price does not hold for similar goods in a budget-constrained sequential auction. If the goods α and β are identical and the bidding function is ordinally equivalent to the income function, then the expected price is higher the later it is sold. If the goods α and β are similar (with a common mean) but the value of one good is even slightly more variable than the other and income is constant across types of bidders, then the expected price is higher the earlier it is sold under 2 n d price rules; under 1 s t price rules, it is higher the later it is sold.
In an auction of multiple identical goods, some assumption is required in addition to those of the standard multi-good auction model to obtain the result that the price of an object depends on its position in the order of sale . Weber (1983) shows that in a standard private valuation sequential auction in which bidders are risk neutral and goods are not to be lower than to be higher than the price of an identical good sold earlier, while in the remaining cases the price does not change over time. In addition, Genesove (1993) suggests that credit-rationing of new and used car dealers may explain the empirical evidence that the sequential position of sale affects the price of a car in wholesale used car auctions. When goods are similar, a corollary of my results offers an explanation of the evidence in terms of the existence of a link between the goods, specifically a budget constraint that causes the willingness and ability to pay for a good to depend not only on some absolute valuation of the good but also on the opportunity cost of paying for good 1 when there is a subsequent possibility of buying good 2. As the income constraints change over the course of a sequential auction, the intensity of competition for later goods changes. A change in the order of sale affects the opportunity cost of winning a good. and marginal utility is declining. When there are more than two bidders, the result also requires some restrictions on the distribution of values. Bernhardt and Scoones (1993) and Gale and Hausch (1992) obtain declining expected prices in a sequential auction of two goods under 2 n d
price rules when bidders are risk neutral. Two assumptions that drive
Bernhardt and Scoones' result are that no bidder can evaluate good 2 until the first has been allocated and that no bidder is allowed to obtain more than one good. In my model the goods may be heterogeneous and the auction form is not restricted to 2 n d price rules. The price of a good depends on the order of sale and the interaction among the valuations and income of bidder types. Each bidder obtains no more than one good in equilibrium, but the bidders are not constrained ex ante from obtaining both goods independent of the prices and bids; further, bidders know their valuations of both goods at the beginning of the auction.
In addition, the valuations and income may be non-monotonic. Other work 1 5 deals with the allocation of multiple goods to multiple bidders, but none of which I am aware specifically analyzes the allocation of multiple goods auctioned sequentially to a set of incompletelyinformed, budget-constrained bidders with private valuations. The aim of the paper is to understand how the relationship between auction revenue, allocation, prices and the order I consider the robustness of the results in Section 7. In order that the valuations are meaningful I assume that for each type, income is at least equal to each valuation; in order that the budget constraint be effective I assume that, for each type, income is at most the sum of the valuations. Precisely,
where the first inequality is strict for t ∈ (0, 1).
This assumption has two implications. (1) Individual t is willing and able to pay up to I(t) in exchange for both goods. I call the maximum amount that an individual is willing and able to pay for a good, the individual's de facto valuation of the good. Thus, income is an individual's de facto valuation of holding both goods. (2) A bidder's de facto valuation of good 2 is the minimum of v 2 and any income remaining after any payment for good 1 is made. A bidder's de facto valuation of good 1 takes into account the fact that the higher the price paid by the winner of good 1 the lower the winner's de facto valuation of good 2.
Thus, losing good 1 at a higher price may enable a bidder to obtain good 2 at a lower price.
A bidder of type t is constrained not to spend more than I(t) (t's income) in the auction.
All units (i.e. bids, budgets and valuations) are restricted to be non-negative. Ties are broken by the flip of a fair coin. The above is common knowledge among the bidders. The sealed bid sequential auction works as follows. Two bidders are selected at random from the population. In the first stage, good 1, which may be α or β, is brought up for sale. Each participant submits a bid for good 1 that lies in [0, I(t)]. higher bid obtains good 1. The price paid for the good depends on the price formation rule in effect. After good 1 is sold, the winner's budget is reduced by the price paid for good 1 and the winning bid is revealed. Bidders then bid on good 2 ({α, β} = {1, 2}).
In the second stage of the game, the de facto valuation for good 2 of a bidder of type t is the minimum of t's initial valuation and t's remaining income. I assume that once good 1 is allocated, the price paid for good 1 along with the income of the winner of good 1 is public knowledge. In this case, it is reasonable to assume that the equilibrium outcome in this second stage is that in which the bidder with the higher de facto valuation obtains the good at the lower de facto valuation, so that the price of good 2 is the lower de facto valuation.
Replacing the second stage of the game by the equilibrium payoffs in this standard equilibrium outcome we obtain a one-stage Bayesian 1 6 game G that depends on the distribution of valuations and resources for each population of bidders. This Bayesian game G is the game that I study. The strategy set of a bidder of type t in G is It is known that the price formation rule can affect the revenue of an auction when information is complete and so also when information is incomplete. I want to isolate the effect of the sequence of sale on the price of a good and therefore restrict to parameters for which revenue is independent of the price formation rule. In order to avoid looking at special cases, and in order to consider auctions in which the revenue is independent of the price formation rule, I assume that, in equilibrium, a bidder's income is large enough to cover expenses and that no bidder is allocated both goods in equilibrium. Moreover, since no individual is allocated both goods in equilibrium, the price of good 2 is the de facto valuation for good 2 of the winner of good 1.
The Sequence of Sale Affects Revenue and Prices
In a standard private value auction of only one good, the valuation of the good (which coincides with a bidder's de facto valuation) increases in a bidder's type and the maximum bidder's type. In budget-constrained sequential auctions, the willingness to pay for good 1 depends on the valuations for both goods and on income. In addition, a bidding function that increases in this willingness to pay may not maximize revenue or allocate goods efficiently.
I first discuss a bidder's de facto valuation for good 1.
In a budget-constrained sequential auction, individual t's de facto valuation of good 1 depends on the type of t's opponent. As shown in the example computed in the introduction, losing good 1 at a high price may enable a bidder to obtain good 2 at a low price. This may be preferred to winning both goods at high prices. Let V (t, s) denote the de facto valuation for good 1 of a bidder of type t who faces another bidder of type s. If a bidder of type t faces a bidder of type s, then it must be the case that bidder t is willing to pay up to
for good 1, since, at such a price, whether the individual wins or loses good 1, the payoff of individual t is v
2 Thus, the de facto valuation of bidder t who faces bidder s equals
Define the critical value v(t) = V (t, t) to be the de facto valuation for good 1 of a bidder of type t who faces another bidder of type t. In the auction literature for one good, the critical value is synonymous with the bidder's valuation for the good. Suppose that f and g are real-valued functions on a domain S. I say that f is ordinally equivalent (denoted ORD-equivalent) to g on S whenever the set of indifference curves and "better than" sets are common for f and g on S.
In particular, any strictly monotonically increasing function is ORD-equivalent to any other strictly monotonically increasing function.
I say that f is ordinally reversed (denoted ORDR-equivalent) to g whenever there is one common set of indifference curves but the "better than" set of one function is the "worse than" set of the other function. In particular, any strictly monotonically increasing function is ORDR-equivalent to any strictly monotonically decreasing function. In a standard auction, the literature restricts to a symmetric equilibrium bidding function that is ORD-equivalent to the valuation function. I consider symmetric equilibrium bidding functions that are ORD-equivalent to the critical value. However, unlike in the private valuation auction literature for one good, a bidding function that is ORD-equivalent to the critical value does not necessarily allocate the goods and income efficiently. It turns out (Theorem 2) that a symmetric equilibrium bidding function that is ORD-equivalent to v In order to show that the set of parameters that satisfy the assumptions is not empty, I
offer a condition that satisfies the assumptions. One condition that would allow one to avoid looking at special cases, and to consider auctions in which the revenue is independent of the price formation rule, is that, for all t
This condition satisfies the two assumptions since no bidder is willing to pay more than the highest critical value and no equilibrium price of good 1 can be lower than the lowest critical value. The second inequality of (2) says that, in equilibrium, any income remaining to the winner of good 1 must be less than or equal to the lowest valuation of good 2. But this implies that the loser of good 1 must obtain good 2 in equilibrium. Moreover, the income of the winner of good 1 is depleted to below the winner's valuation of good 2. It follows that the price of good 2 is the depleted income of the winner of good 1. But then, in equilibrium Revenue = income of the winner of good 1
It is immediate that a bidding function that is ORD-equivalent to the income function maximizes auction revenue. In the theorem below I consider budget-constrained sequential auctions in which income and valuations satisfy all assumptions (this may happen for example if the parameters satisfy (1) and (2)) and whose price formation rules satisfy the following conditions.
(S1) Bidders are treated anonymously (prices do not depend on the identity of bidders).
(S2) A good is sold to the higher bidder at a price that does not decrease in the bids.
(S3) Good 2 is sold to the bidder with the current higher de facto valuation at a price equal to the current lower de facto valuation. Whether revenue is maximized or the allocation is efficient depends on the equivalence between the bidding function and the functions v auction of one good, the efficient allocation is that in which the good is allocated to the bidder with the highest valuation. This is because, without budget constraints, a bidder is always willing and able to bid up to the bidder's valuation. An allocation in a budgetconstrained auction is efficient if there are no Pareto improving trades but the willingness and ability of an individual to pay for a good depends not only on the bidder's valuation for the good but also on the bidder's remaining income. In any auction allocation of goods and money let type t θ denote the type allocated good θ and income R θ for θ ∈ (α, β).
We next explore when an allocation is efficient and revenue is maximized. All proofs not in the text are in the Appendix.
Theorem 2 In any budget-constrained sequential auction, the expected revenue is independent of the price formation rules and depends only on the shape of the equilibrium bidding function B. Whenever B(t) is ORD-equivalent to I(t), expected revenue is maximized. Moreover, such a revenue-maximizing sequential auction reaps more revenue than any auction in which both goods are bundled and allocated simultaneously to one of the bidders. Whenever B(t) is ORD-equivalent to v 1 (t) − v 2 (t), the allocation of goods and money is efficient.
The Corollary follows immediately from Theorem 2. the proof here does not require the explicit calculation of equilibrium bidding functions, the bidders know their valuations ex ante, and the bidders may bid on more than one good. Thus, if there is a book value for one good that is highly valued but the value for the other good is relatively low but highly variable then revenue is maximized when the good with the book value is sold last. This predicts that, in estate auctions, heavy equipment (for example, ride on lawn mowers) will be sold later than an item whose value may depend more heavily on taste (for example, used bedspreads).
Note that I do not consider auctions in which all surplus is always extracted from the winner of good 2. One such case is that in which good 1 is allocated via an auction mechanism and good 2 is awarded to the loser of good 1 at the loser's valuation (which can be achieved if the bidding function is monotonic and the auctioneer knows the bidding function and therefore knows the valuations for good 2 once good 1 is allocated). In this case, it can be shown that the expected revenue is independent of the auction mechanism under which good 1 is awarded; the maximal expected revenue is the expected value of min{v price sealed bid auction to n bidders whose incomes are not constrained. In their model, a consumer's valuation of a unit depends on how many units the consumer has already bought. Under some assumptions on valuations 1 7 , the expected price of the second unit sold is higher than that of the first. The result below is not restricted to 2 n d price rules. 
Theorem 4 If the equilibrium bidding function B(t) is ORD-equivalent to
It follows immediately that whenever each bidder considers the two goods to be identical, the expected price of the good 1 sold is higher than that of good 1.
for all t and the equilibrium bidding function is ORD-equivalent to I, then the expected price of good 2 sold is higher than that of good 1.
In particular, the expected prices differ if the goods are identical across bidder types. I now explore opportunities for arbitrage in this case.
for all t and the equilibrium bidding function is ORDequivalent to I, then the expected price that any one bidder expects to pay in the auction is constant across bidders.
Theorems 4 and 6 state that when v α (t) = v β (t) for all t and the bidding function is ORDequivalent to I, the expected price of good 1 is less than that of good 2 even though the expected price that any one bidder expects to pay in the auction is constant across bidders. To see how this result is possible, let p * be the common expected price that a bidder expects to pay in the auction. Since good 1 is allocated to the bidder with the higher bid and good 2 is allocated to the bidder with the lower bid, the bidder whose type is associated with the highest bid obtains good 1 for sure at a price of p * , while the bidder whose type is associated with the lowest bid obtains good 2 for sure at a price of p * . Since the price paid for a good is increasing in the bids, p * is the highest price paid for good 1 and the lowest price paid for good 2. A bidder whose type is associated with a bid between the highest and lowest bids sometimes obtains good 1 for a price lower than p * and sometimes obtains good 2 for a price higher than p * but on average obtains a good for a price of p * .Thus, the price that any single bidder expects to pay in the auction is constant across bidders even though the expected price of good 1 is lower than that of good 2. A violation of the law of one price does not imply opportunities for arbitrage. the prices of the goods. However, as shown below, the price formation rule may affects the prices even in the case that income is constant across types. In addition, the price formation rule may affect the way in which the price of a good depends on the sequence of sale. Let B be an equilibrium bidding function. Since (B, B) is an equilibrium of G, the "truthful" strategy profile in which each type t chooses t is an equilibrium of the associated game G(B) in which each bidder's strategy set is the set [0, 1] of types and the payoff of type t when s is announced is that which type t obtains in G when type t bids B(s). I study equilibria of G(B) for any continuous bidding function B that is not constant over any interval. Riley and Samuelson (1981) study only continuous bidding functions that increase in t since the valuation of the single good is continuous and increases in t. They find that the equilibrium price (and therefore revenue) is independent of the price formation rule. By contrast, even though the expected revenue is independent of the price formation rule, the equilibrium price of good 1 varies with the rule.
The Expected Price of a Good Depends on the Price Formation Rule

Theorem 7
The equilibrium price of good 1 depends on the price formation rules.
Thus, even though the world is restricted to be one in which the expected revenue is independent of the price formation rule, the expected prices do vary with the rules. Che and Gale [1993] show that in a budget-constrained auction of one good, the expected price of the single good (which is equivalent to revenue in this case) is higher under 1 s t price rules than under 2 n d price rules. In the auctions that we consider, revenue is constant across price rules but the price of each good varies across rules.
Relationship between Bidding Function and Exogenous Functions
In this section, we analyze the relationship between the shape of the equilibrium bidding function and either
. We first show that the existence of a non-monotonic equilibrium bidding function is tied to the existence of a non-monotonic v 
We say that a function is S-monotonic on an interval T if, for t ∈ T , the indifference curve through t is the singleton {t}. We now show that the existence of an S-monotonic equilibrium bidding function on an interval T is tied to the existence of a monotonic v We note that when P is not a member of the class of price rules assumed by Theorem 9, then B may or may not be ORD-equivalent to v 1 − v 2 + I when B is monotonic 1 8 . Theorems 8 and 9 indicate the possible existence of multiple bidding functions that differ with respect to allocation, revenue and efficiency then the expected revenue is independent of the sequence of sale and the expected price of a good is higher, the later it is sold. price rules the expected price of a good is higher the earlier it is sold.
Clearly whether the price of a good increases or decreases with its order in the sequence of sale depends on the price formation rules in this case price rules, a bidder is able to bid up the price of good 1 in order to obtain good 2 at a lower price than otherwise. price rules in this section. Previously, I have assumed that bidders draw their types from a common pool and that the number of bidders and goods equal two. I have also assumed that each valuation is less than income and that no individual obtains both goods in equilibrium. My aim in this section is to show that revenue and prices can be affected by the sequence in which the goods are sold even when these assumptions are relaxed. In particular, I consider two possibilities below.
In the first, the number of bidders is larger than the number of goods and the income is less than the valuations. In the second, one bidder may obtain both goods in equilibrium.
I first provide an example in which the order of sale in a sequential auction of two goods can affect the revenue of an auction and the price of a good even in the presence of many bidders who each have a common income. Consider an auction of two goods α and β to n > 2 bidders. Suppose that I(t) = I and v
so that each individual has constant income that is less than the valuation of either good and each individual highly values good α relative to good β and income. Note that, since each bidder is endowed with a common fixed income that is less than the valuation of either good, no bidder obtains more than one good in equilibrium. I want to compare the price of each good if the order of sale is αβ to that when the order of sale is βα. If the order of sale is αβ then each individual's equilibrium bidding function for good α is 2 1
B(t) = I.
Thus, the expected equilibrium price of good α is I. Since n > 2 there are still at least two individuals with an income of I who compete for good β. So, when the goods are sold in the order αβ, the price of good α is I; that of good β is I since n > 2. If instead, the goods are sold in the order βα then I claim that the expected price of β is less than I. The reason is as follows. Suppose that the expected price of β is I. In this case, at least two individuals bid I. Let m ≥ 2 be the number of individuals who bid I. The payoff to each who bids I is (v
while the payoff to anyone who bids just less
be that m ≥ 2 bidders bid I in equilibrium. Thus, the equilibrium price of β must be less than I. It follows that when the goods are sold in the order βα the expected equilibrium price of β is less than I as claimed. Thus, revenue is highest when α is sold first and the price of β increases with its position in the order of sale. The reason is that when β is sold second, there are always at least two individuals who are willing and able to pay I for β so that competition is intense when β is sold second; when β is sold first, competition is not as intense since each bidder wants to have income to bid on good α.
The above illustrates that the revenue and prices of goods may depend on the sequence in which the goods are sold even when there are many bidders and only two goods. Under the above assumptions, revenue is maximized when the more valuable good is sold first.
I now analyse the model when there are asymmetries among the bidders as well as changes to the assumptions on income relative to valuations so that a bidder may obtain both goods in equilibrium. Let's assume that the valuations of the two goods are fixed such that v bidder 1 has enough income to buy both goods since bidder 2 is relatively and absolutely poor. If the goods are auctioned in the order α, β then each bidder is willing to pay at least I for α so that bidder one obtains good α at a price of I in equilibrium. Once good α is allocated, each bidder is willing to pay at least I for good β. Since bidder one has more than double the income of bidder two and since good α is relatively highly valued, bidder one obtains both goods in equilibrium when the order of sale is αβ. The equilibrium price of each good equals I and the equilibrium revenue is 2I. However, now suppose that the goods are sold in the order β, α. In this case, bidder one is not willing to pay I for good β. The payoff to bidder one is A − (I − p) if bidder one gives up good β to bidder two at a price of p. If instead, bidder one wins good β at a price of p then bidder one receives B − p + A − I. It follows that the most that bidder one is willing to pay for good β is B/2 < I. Bidder two is willing to pay up to I for good β since otherwise, bidder two receives nothing. In the equilibrium allocation when the goods are sold in the order βα, bidder two obtains good β and bidder one obtains good α. The equilibrium price of β is B/2 and that of α is I − B/2.
The equilibrium revenue is I. In summary, the revenue is higher when α (the more highly valued good) is sold first; the price of good α (the good that is allocated to the rich bidder independent of its order of sale) is higher when α is sold first; the price of good β (the good that is allocated to the rich bidder only when it is sold second) is higher when β is sold second. That revenue is higher when α is sold first is consistent with the implications of Theorem 2 in which the revenue is higher when good 1 is sold to the rich bidder. Under the assumptions of Theorem 12, α is allocated to the rich bidder, independent of the order of sale and the price of α is higher the earlier it is sold under 2 n d price rules. In our example, α is allocated to the rich bidder independent of the order of sale and the price of α is higher C  o  n  s  t  r  a  i  n  e  d  S  eu  e  n  t  i  a  l  A  u  c  t  i  o  n  s  w  i  t  h  I  n  c  o  m  p  l  e  t  e  I  n  f  o  r  m  a  t  i  o  n the earlier it is sold. That the price of good α is higher when sold first in our example is therefore consistent with Theorem 12. Under the assumptions of Theorem 11 the price of a good is higher the later it is sold when the competition for the good is higher the later it is sold. In our example, β is allocated to the rich bidder only when it is sold second so that competition for β is higher when it is sold second. That the price of good β is higher when sold second is consistent with Theorem 11. Thus, even when one bidder is relatively rich, revenue and price may depend on the order of sale. If there is one good that is highly valued by all and there is a clearly strong bidder then revenue is higher when the more valuable good is sold first; the more valuable good is allocated to the stronger bidder independent of its position of sale and its price is higher when it is sold first; the less valuable good is allocated to the stronger bidder only if it sold second and its price is higher when it is sold second. Whether the price of a good increases or decreases with its position in the order of sale depends on how the order of sale affects the competition for the good. The price of a good is affected by the order of sale. How it is affected depends on the valuations. In one case, the price is higher when a good is sold earlier. In another case, the price is higher when a good is sold later. It depends on whether, in equilibrium, good 1 goes to the stronger bidder independent of which good is sold first or whether a designated good goes to the stronger bidder. When good 1 goes to the stronger bidder independent of the order of sale, then there is no disadvantage in obtaining good 1 because, if there were, the stronger bidder would just mimic the weaker bidder. In this case, the price of a good must increase with its position in the order of sale. When a designated good goes to the higher bidder, then the competition for the good is higher when it is sold first and so price decreases with its position in the order of sale.
Conclusion
In the presence of budget constraints there may exist two symmetric equilibrium bidding functions that differ with respect to allocation, prices and revenue. Prices depend on the price formation rules. In addition, even in the absence of arbitrage possibilities, identical goods may fetch different prices. The sequence of sale affects the expected revenue through the allocation of the goods. Whenever the winner of good 1 is the bidder with the higher income, expected revenue is maximized. Under 1 s t and 2 n d price rules, whenever, independent of the sequence, the winner of good 1 is the bidder with the higher income, the expected price rules, there is an incentive for the loser of good 1 to bid up its price, depleting the winner's income, in order to obtain good 2 at a lower price.
Thus, when the allocation of the goods is independent of the sequence and 2nd price rules prevail, the expected price of a good declines with its position in the order of sale. Under 1 s t price rules, a higher bid of the loser does not affect the price of good 1 and may adversely affect the payoff of the loser so that bids are more conservative.
Basically, the price of a good is higher whenever competition for the good is higher. If bidders are drawn from populations that differ according to income, then goods that are always allocated to the richer bidder fetch a higher price when sold first. Goods that are sold to the richer bidder only when sold second fetch a higher price when sold second.
Other links between the goods can have the same effect as do budget-constraints. For example, if firms with limited plant capacities bid on projects let by the government, the results of letting any given contract will depend on the available capacity of firms in the industry. The results should not be qualitatively different in this case.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: By (R), expected revenue equals the expected income of the winner of good 1. If B(t) is ORD-equivalent to I(t) under any price formation rule then good 1 is allocated to the bidder with the higher income so that, by (R), the expected revenue is the expected value of the higher income. Thus, the expected revenue is independent of the price formation rules and depends only on the shape of the equilibrium bidding function.
We now compare revenue in the revenue-maximizing sequential auction to that in an auction in which both goods are sold simultaneously. When both goods are sold simultaneously to one of the bidders, rather than sequentially, an individual t's de facto valuation of holding both goods is I(t) by assumption (1) . Thus, the auction in which both goods are sold simultaneously is equivalent to an auction in which one good is sold whose value to individual t is I(t). The result follows since no auction of a single good can yield an expected revenue equal to the expected value of the highest valuation (Riley and Samuelson [1981] and I, the average price that a bidder of type t expects to pay for good 1 is strictly less than bidder t's critical value v(t) = (v 1 (t) − v 2 (t) + I(t))/2. In this case the expected price of good 1 must be strictly less than the critical value of the expected winner. Thus, the expected price of good 1 must be strictly less than
However, by (R), the expected revenue is I(w 
Proof of Theorem 6:
If the other bidder uses the equilibrium strategy B(t), let ∆(x) be the probability that a bidder of type t who pretends to be type x wins good 2 and let P (x) be the expected payment made by such a bidder. The expected payoff Π(t, x) of such a bidder equals the expected benefit minus the expected payment
denote the partial derivative operator with respect to the ith variable. In equilibrium, D 2 Π(t, x) equals 0 when x = t so that
Since v
(t), (3) implies P (t) = 0 for all t as required.
In order to prove the next Theorem, we need to develop further the expected payment made by an individual of type t who pretends to be of type x. Let P * (x) denote the expected price that an individual (who claims to be of type x) pays for good 1 and P * (x) denote the expected price that an individual (who claims to be of type x) pays for good 2. 
. Let P (x, z) denote the price that an individual who claims to be of type x pays for good 1 if the other individual claims to be of type z. It is also necessary to define the circumstances under which an individual might win good 2. Recall that the de facto valuation of good 2 of a bidder of type t is the minimum of t's valuation for good 2 and any income remaining to t from the auction of good 1. The individual with the higher de facto valuation obtains good 2 at the lower de facto valuation. There are two ways in which individual t may obtain good 2. Either individual t wins good 1 and has enough income remaining to win good 2 as well; or, individual t loses good 1 and t's valuation of good 2 is higher than the remaining income of t's opponent.
Let σ 1 (t, x) be the set of opponents who lose good 1. Of these, some may also lose good 2. Denote this latter set by σ (s), I(s) − P (s, x)}. In equilibrium, the expected payoff must be maximized when x = t. By assumption, no bidder wins both goods in equilibrium so that, in equilibrium, σ H (s)ds with respect to x. Thus, in equilibrium,
Proof of Theorem 7: In equilibrium, P (s, t) = P (t, t) for all endpoints s of intervals in σ 2 (t, t) that depend on t. Since, in equilibrium, o  n  s  t  r  a  i  n  e  d  S  eu  e  n  t  i  a  l  A  u  c  t  i  o  n  s  w  i  t  h  I  n  c  o  m  p  l  e  t  e  I  n  f  o  r  m  a  t  i  o  n we can substitute for P (t, t)∆ (t) from (4) to obtain
The left-hand side of (5) is the expected price of good one and the right-hand side of (5) depends on the price formation rule 2 2 . The result follows.
Proof of Theorem 8: Equation (4) implies that, for , we can rewrite (7) for t ∈ S 1 , as
If we then multiply both side of (8) above by x (t) we obtain that, for However, by definition of x(t), σ
P (t, t) = P ( x(t), x(t)), and
, is equivalent to
Thus, (6) and (11) must hold for t ∈ S 1 which implies the result.
Proof of Theorem 9:
If B is S-increasing on T then σ 2 (t, t) = (t, 1) and σ
In the case that one of (12) implies that either
(t) + I(t))H (t)
or DP (t, t)H(t) + 2P (t, t)H (t) = (v 1 (t) − v
so that either P (t, t)(1 − H(t)) However, since P (t, t) is ORD-equivalent to B(t), and since B is S-increasing on T , this implies that v The following lemmas are used to prove Theorems 10, 11, and 12. Given any bidding function B and its associated probability ∇(t) = 1 − ∆(t), there is a monotonic cover of B. Denote by J the union of intervals over which the cover is strictly monotonic and let c = ∇ 
